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with the views expressed in 
Shenk, J., Carter J., and Spence, J., con-
J.~-I dissent. I agree with the reasoning in the 
prepared by Mr. Presiding ,Tu:stiee Barnard for the 
District Court of Ap1wal in Oounty of San Diego v. San 
Gas & Electric Oo. (Cal.App), 299 P.2d 664. 
J., concurred. 
's petition for a rehearing was denied JYiareh 
Hl57. Sehanl'r. ,J., and 1\IcComb, ,] ., were of' the opinion 
that the ition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 24123. Iu Bunk. J1"eb. 19, 1957.] 
MARION WILDMAN et al. Appellants, v. GOVEHNl\'lEN'f 
KMPLOYEES' INSUHANCE COMPANY (a Corpora-
tion), Respondent. 
lb] Automobiles-Insurance-Persons Insured.-A restrictive 
endorsement on an automobile liability policy was ambiguous 
where it defined "insured" as including "the named insured, 
the individual named below, and any member of the insured's 
immediate family" and, after the words "No ExCEPTIONs," 
continued, "while using the automobile or legally responsible 
for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile 
is with the permission of the named insured"; the words 
"No EXCEP'l.'IOKS" apparently applied to the named insured 
and members of his immediate family while any of them were 
using the automobile or had consented and permitted its use 
by someone else, since the phrase referring to use with consent 
and permission would otherwise have no effect; hence the 
policy must be construed as extending coverage to persons 
suffering bodily injury or property damage caused by the 
vehicle in question when it was being driven by the named 
insured or members of their immediate family, and also by 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 276; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 166. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Automobiles,§ 68-1; [2, 4] Insur-
ance,§ 60; [3] Insurance,§ 62; [6] Automobiles,§ 78; [7, 9] Auto-
mobiles, § 68-3; [8, 10] Automobiles, § 68. 
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someone else driving the vehicle with the consent and permis-
sion of the named insured. 
[2] Insurance- Interpretation of Contract- Against Insurer.-
Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be 
resolved against the insurer. 
(3] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-With Reference to Objects. 
-If semantically permissible, an insurance contract will be 
given such construction as will fairly achieve its object of 
securing indemnity to the insured for the losses to which the 
insurance relates. 
[4a, 4b] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-Against Insurer.-If an 
insurer uses language which is uncertain any reasonable doubt 
will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent or 
fact of coverage, whether as to the peril insured against, the 
amount of liability, or the person or persons protected, the 
language will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for 
the insured's benefit. 
[5] Automobiles-Insurance-Persons Insured.-The words "no 
exceptions" in a restrictive endorsement on an automobile 
policy cannot apply to use of the automobile by another with 
the consent and permission of the insured where such use 
is specifically set forth later in the same paragraph in which 
the quoted words appear. 
[6] Id.-Insurance-Findings.-A finding that the coverage af-
forded by an automobile liability policy applies only when 
one of the named insureds or members of their immediate 
family are using the car, and also when someone else is driv-
ing with the consent and permission of the insured, is incon-
sistent since the coverage afforded by the policy cannot apply 
two ways at the same time. 
[7] Id.-Insurance-Risks-Exceptions.-An insurance company 
does not have the right to limit its coverage in an automobile 
liability policy issued by it by excluding coverage when the 
automobile is used by someone other than the insured with 
the insured's permission, in view of Veh. Code, §§ 402, 415, 
which are a part of every such policy. 
[8] !d.-Insurance-Law as Part of Contract.-Veh. Code, § 415, 
requiring a liability policy to insure the person named therein 
"and any other person using or responsible for the use of 
said motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or 
implied permission of said assured," must be made a part of 
every policy of insurance issued by an insurer, since the 
public policy of the state is to make owners of motor vehicles 
financially responsible to those injured by them in the opera-
tion of such vehicles. 
[9] Id.-Insurance-Risks-Exceptions.--For an insurer to issue 
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an insurance policy which does not cover an accident which 
occurs when a person other than the insured is driving with 
the insured's permission and consent is a violation of the 
public policy of this state as set forth in Veh. Code, §§ 402, 415. 
[10] !d.-Insurance--Law as Part of Contract.-Inasmuch as Veh. 
Code, §§ 402, 415, relating to civil liability and financial 
responsibility of owners and operators of vehicles, set forth 
the public policy of the state, such laws must be considered 
a part of every liability policy though the policy itself does 
not specifically make them a part thereof. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Charles C. Haines, Judge.* Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief. Judgment for defendant 
reversed. 
Swing, Scharnikow & Staniforth and Robert 0. Staniforth 
for Appellants. 
Luce, Forward, Kuuzel & Scripps and James L. l!'ocht, 
Jr., for Respondent. 
Weinstock, Anderson, Maloney & Chase as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Respondent. 
CAI~TER, J.-Plaintiffs Marion Wildman and Elvaree 
\Vildman, husband and wife, appeal from a judgment in 
favor of Government Employees' Insurance Company. 
On February 3, 1955, Eusebio Bonifacio and Cecilia Boni-
facio were the owners of a 1953 Cadillac eoupe automobile. 
Plaintiff Elvaree suffered personal injuries and the property 
of both plaintiffs was damaged, on February 3, 1955, as the 
result of the negligent operation of the Cadillac whieh, at 
the time of the aecident, was being operated by Victoria 
Villaneuva with the permission and consent of the Bonifacios. 
Plaintiffs obtained a judgment, whieh is now final, against 
Victoria Villaneuva and Cecilia Bonifacio in the sum of 
$5,000 and eosts in the sum of $66.90. The judgment is un-
satisfied and the Bonifacios are insolvent. 
Prior to the time of the aeeident defendant insurance 
company had issued to Eusebio Bonifacio a poliey of insur-
ance. Plaintiffs brought an action in declaratory relief to 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
48 C.2d-2 
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obtain a declaration of the legal rights and duties of the 
defendant insurance compauy nnder the policy and for a 
judgment requiring it to pay the judgment theretofore ob-
tained by plaintiffs against Cecilia Bonifacio. The trial court 
concluded that plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and 
entered judgment to the effect that the insurance afforded 
by the defendant's policy did not cover the accident. 
Plaintiffs contend that the restrichn: endorsement on the 
policy is ambiguous. Under the terms of the insurance policy 
involved, defendant agreed to indemnify Eusebio Bonifacio 
awl Ceeilia Bonif<wio against auy liability not cxeeecling the 
sum of $10,000, together with taxed court costs and interest 
1rhid1 mig·ht arise against Buscbio and Cvcilia in favor of 
any person or persons who should sustain any damage to 
their persons or property by reason of an accident incurred 
while Eusebio or Cecilia were using the automobile or legally 
responsibile for the use thereof, provided the use was with 
the consent and permission of Eusebio or Cecilia. An en-
dorsement was attached to the policy, dated Deeember 3, 
1954, and proYided: 
'' 1. The first sentence of Insuring Agreement III, Defini-
tion of Insured, is eliminated and is hereby replaced by the 
following: 
"With respect to the insurance for Bodily Injury Liability 
and Property Damage I,iability the unqualified word 'in-
sured' includes the named insured, the individual named be-
low, and any member of the insuret1 's immediate family 
No ExcEPTIONS 
while using tlw automobile or legally responsible for the US(' 
thereof, providl'd the actual use of the automobilco is with 
the permission of the named insured. 
"2. Such insurance as is afforded by this policy does not 
apply while any person not an insured as defined in Para-
graph 1 above is using the antornobile, except that such in-
surance as is afforded for lVIedical Payments applies with 
respect to bodily injury to or sidmess, disease or death of 
the named insured, the individual named below, aHd any 
member of the insured's immediate family. 
'' 3. As evidenced by the signature below of the named 
insured, the named insured acknowledges and agrees that this 
endorsement forms a part of the above captioned policy issued 
by the Government Employees Insurance Company and is 
effective as of 12 :01 A.M. Standard Time on the effective 
date of the endorsement." 
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Defendant contends that the endorsement controls, is un-
and provides coverage only when the automobile 
in question is driven by the insured or one of his immediate 
family. 
[la] We agree with plaintiffs that the endorsement is 
ambiguous. If the words "No ExcEPTIONS" were not prrsent, 
the policy would read as follows: ''the unqualified word 
'insured' indudes the named insnred, the individual named 
and any member of the insmed's immediate family 
while using the automobile or legally responsible for the use 
thereof, provided the actual usc of the automobile is with 
the permission of the rwrned insnral." (Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 2 provides that the policy docs not apply while 
any person not an insured as defined in Paragraph 1 is using 
the ear ''except that'' the provision for medieal payments 
applied to the named insured and members of his immediate 
family. The question is, to what do the words "No ExcEP-
TIONS" relate 1 Immediately following the words "No Ex-
CEPTIONS" comes the statement "while using the automobile 
or legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual 
nse of the automobile is with the permission of the named 
insured." It appears that the "no exceptions" applies to 
the named insured and members of his immediate family 
while any of them were using the automobile or had con-
Bellied and permitted its use by someone else. The phrase 
referring to use with consent and permission would, other-
wise, have no effect wl1atsoevcr inasmuch as Eusebio, Cecilia 
and members of their immediate family were directly covered 
by the policy in the first part of paragraph 1. [2] "It is 
elementary in insurance law that any ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the 
insurer. (Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. (1955), 
supra, 45 Oal.2d 81, 83 [286 P.2d 816]; Coit v. Jefferson 
Standard L1:fe Ins. Co. (1946), supra, 28 Cal.2d 1, 3 [168 
P.2d 163, 168 A.hR. 673]; 5 Am.Jur. 790, § 507.) [3] If 
semantically permissible, the rontract will be given such con-
struction as will fairly achieve its object of securing indemnity 
to the insured for the losses to which the insurance relates. 
(Fageol T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1941), ]8 Oal.2d 
748, 75] [117 P.2c1 669] .) [4a] If the insurer uses language 
which is uncertain any reasonable doubt will be resolved 
against it; if the doubt relates to extent or fact of coverage, 
wlwther as to prril immrec1 against (Fageol T. & C. Co. v. 
Pacific Inclem. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 731, 746-747 [16, 17] 
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l117 P.2d 661]; Ocean etc. Corp., Ltd. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com. (1924), 194 Cal. 127, 132 [228 P. 1]; Miller v. United 
Ins. Co. (1952), 113 Cal.App.2d 493 [248 P.2d 113]; Pendell 
v. Westland Life Ins. Co. (1950), 95 Cal.App.2d 766, 770 
[214 P.2d 392]; see also Christojjer v. Hartford Ace. etc. 
Co. (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d Supp. 979 [267 P.2d 887]), the 
amount of liability (Hobson v. Mutual Benefit H.&; A. Assn. 
(1950), 99 Cal.App.2d 330, 333 et seq. [221 P.2d 761]; see 
also Na1·ver v. California State Life Ins. Co. (1930), 211 
Cal. 176, 180 et seq. [294 P. 393]) or the person or persons 
protected (Olson v. Standard Marine Ins. Co. (1952), 109 
Cal.App.2d 130, 135 [1, 5] [240 P.2d 379]; see also Island 
v. Pireman's P1tnd Indem. Co. (1947), 30 Cal.2d 541, 543, 
548 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896]; Sly v. American Indem. 
Co. (1932), 127 Cal.App. 202 [15 P.2d 522] ), the language 
will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the benefit 
of the insured.'' (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. 
Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 437, 438 [296 P.2d 801] .) 
In the case under consideration the ambiguous words are 
''no exceptions.'' W cbster 's New International Dictionary 
defines ''exception'' as an exclusion or taking out by excep-
tion something that would otherwise be included. [5] Inas-
much as use by another with the consent and permission of 
the insured is specifically set forth later in the same para-
graph the words "no exceptions" can hardly be construed to 
apply to that situation. Paragraph 2 provides that the medi-
cal payments provided for in the policy apply only when 
bodily injury or sickness or death is suffered by the named 
insured or any member of his immediate family. It appears 
that paragraphs 1 and 2 cannot be reconciled insofar as cover-
age is concerned. [6] Finding II of the trial court ( Cl. Tr. 
12) is inconsistent in itself. In that finding the court found 
that the defendant agreed to "indemnify the said Eusebio P. 
Bonifacio and Cecelia Bonifacio against any liability not ex-
ceeding the sum of $10,000.00, together with taxed court costs 
and interest, which should arise against the said Eusebio P. 
Bonifacio or Cecelia Bonifacio in favor of any person or 
persons who should sustain any damage to their property and 
also in favor of any person or persons who should sustain 
any bodily injuries by rrason of an accident occurring while 
the Raid Eusebio P. Bonifacio or Cecelia Bonifacio were using 
the said automobile or legally responsible for the use thereof, 
provided s1wh use was w1:th thp, permission and consent of 
the sa1:d Ensebio P. Bon1:facio or Cecelia Bonifacio, and pro-
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vided further that said automobile was not being used at said 
time by any person other than the said Eusebio P. Bonifacio or 
Cecelia Bonifacio or members of their immediate family. 
" (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from this finding 
that the coverage afforded by the policy cannot apply two 
ways at the same time: it cannot apply only when one of the 
named insureds, or members of their immediate family, are 
using the car and also when someone else is driving with the 
consent and permission of the insured. [4b] The insurer, 
having caused the uncertainty and ambiguity which exists 
in the policy under consideration, must have that ambiguity 
and uncertainty resolved against it under the well settled 
rule in this state and elsewhere. (See Continental Oas. Co. v. 
Phoenix Constr. Oo., 46 Cal.2d 423, 437, 438 [296 P.2d 801], 
heretofore quoted, and cases cited therein.) ''The lan-
guage will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the 
benefit of the insured." ( (Jontinental Cas. (Jo. v. Phoenix 
Constr. Co., supra, at page 438.) [lb] With these rules in 
mind the policy must be construed as extending coverage to 
persons suffering bodily injury or property damage caused 
by the vehicle in question when it was being driven by the 
named insured, or members of their immediate family, and 
also by someone else driving the vehicle with the consent and 
permission of the named insured. It follows from what 
we have said that the trial court erred in concluding that the 
policy in question ''did not apply at the time of the accident 
on February 3, 1955, when Victoria Villanueva was driving 
the Cadillac automobile owned by Eusebio P. Bonifacio and 
Cecelia Bonifacio.'' 
Plaintiffs also contend that if the policy in question does 
not apply when the automobile covered is being driven by 
someone other than the insured persons but with the consent 
and permission of the insured that it violates the provisions 
of section 415 of the Vehicle Code. That section, which is 
entitled "Contents and Requirements of motor vehicle lia-
bility policy" provides as follows: 
"RE·QUISITES OF MoTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY PoLICY. 
"(a) [Motor vehicle liability policy defined; requirements.] 
A 'motor vehicle liability policy,' as used in this code means a 
policy of liability insurance issued by an insurance carrier 
authorized to transact such business in this State to or for 
the benefit of the person named therein as assured, which 
policy shall meet the following requirements : 
"(1) Such policy shall designate by explicit description 
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or appropriate reference all motor velJicles with respect to 
whieh coverage is thereby intended to be granted. 
"(2) Such policy shall insure the person named therein 
and any other· person using m· responsible for the use of said 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied 
said assured." ( :BJmphasis added.) 
[7] Defendant insurance company argues that it had the 
right to limit its coverage in a policy of insurance issued by 
it ''and when it has clone so, the plain language of the 
limitation must be respected." (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoe-
nix Constr. Co., 46 Cal.2c1 at page 432.) Defendant's argu-
ment is without merit. In the Continental Casualty Company 
case, the restrictive endorsement defined the vehicles covered 
by the policy. It was held not to apply to the coverage on 
the authorized vehicles and hence could not apply to the 
drivers thereof. 
'l'he policy involved here provides, under the heading 
'' CoNDI'l'IONS'' in section 8 that ''Such insurance as is af-
forded by this policy for bodily injury liability or property 
damage liability shall comply with the provisions of the motor 
vehicle financial responsibility law of any state or province 
which shall be applicable with respect to any such liability 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the auto-
mobile during the policy period, to the extent of the cover-
age and limits of liability required by such law, but in no 
event in excess of the limits of liability stated in this policy. 
The Insured agrees to reimburse the company for any pay-
ment made by the eompany which it would not have been 
obligated to make under the terms of this policy except for 
the agreement contained in this paragraph.'' In section 23, 
also under the heading ''CoNDITIONS'' it is stated ''Terms 
of Policy Conformed to Statute. 'l'erms of this policy which 
are in conflict with the statutes of the State wherein this 
policy is issued are hereby amended to conform to such 
statutes.'' 
No case construing section 415 of the Vehicle Code as it 
relati•s to the circumstances here present has been cited to 
ns, nor has independent research revealed one.* In North-
wcst Cas. Co. v. Legg, 91 Cal.App.2d 19, 24 [204 P.2d 
106], the court said: "Section 415 is a part of the Financial 
Responsibility Ijaw. As such, it is directly related to the 
*The question here presented was not determined by this court in 
Norris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 39 Cal.2d 420 [247 P.2d 1]; Souza v. 
Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861]. 
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matter of suspending and reinstating operators' licenses in 
with proving ability to respond in damages for 
caused to others. Whether or not these provisions 
are controlling with respect to the contract which an insurer 
may rnake with an ins~tred, and their relation to the provisions 
requirements contained in the Insurance Code, need not 
be here decided." (Emphasis added.) [8] It appears that 
section 415 must be made a part of every policy of insurance 
issued by an insurer since the public policy of this state is 
to make owners of motor vehicles financially responsible to 
those injured by them in the operation of such vehicles. 
Section 402 of the Vehicle Code provides that ''Every owner 
of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of 
or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in 
the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such 
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the 
same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner, 
and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the 
owner for all purposes of civil damages.'' [9] We are of 
the opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance 
which does not cover an accident which occurs when a person, 
other than the insured, is driving with the permission and 
consent of the insured is a violation of the public policy of 
this state as set forth in sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle 
Code. In Malrngren v. Southwestern Auto. Ins. Co., 201 CaL 
29, 33, 34 [255 P. 512], an analogous situation was involved. 
The insurance carrier sought to avoid liability on the ground 
that its liability did not accrue under the policy until an 
execution issued upon the judgment obtained against the as-
sured, or judgment debtor, was returned unsatisfied by reason 
of the insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured. At that time 
the law of this state (Stats. 1919, p. 776) provided that every 
policy of insurance should contain a provision that the in-
solvency or bankruptcy of the insured person should not 
release the carrier for the payment of damages sustained. The 
court said: ''The statute of this state, which is the final word 
on this issue, does not make the return of the execution un-
satisfied a prerequisite to the commencement of an action upon 
the policy. . . . The substantive law of this state cannot be 
enlarged, circumvented, defeated, or modified by any pro-
vision which the insurer may have elected to place in its con-
tract in derogation of or in conflict therewith. The statute is 
founded upon principles of public policy and an anomalous 
situation would be created if the rights of third parties, for 
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whose protection the law was adopted, could be hindered, 
delayed, or defeated by the private agreements of two of the 
parties to a triparty contract." (See also to the same effect, 
Hynding v. Home Ace. Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 747 [7 P.2d 
999, 85 A.L.R. 13] ; Belt Cas. Co. v. Furman, 218 Cal. 359, 
363 [23 P.2d 293]; Western Mach. Co. v. Bankers Indem. 
Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 488, 492 [75 P.2d 609] ; Olds v. General 
Ace. Fire etc. Corp., 67 Cal.App.2d 812, 822 [155 P.2d 676] ; 
Bias v. Ohio Farmers Indem. Co., 28 Cal.App.2d 14, 16 [81 
P.2d 1057] ; Pigg v. International lndem. Co., 86 Cal.App. 
671, 673 [261 P. 486] .) 
[10] Inasmuch as sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code 
set forth the public policy of this state such laws must be 
considered a part of every policy of liability insurance even 
though the policy itself does not specifically make such laws 
a part thereof. We have here, however, a policy containing a 
clause which provides that the insurance afforded by the 
policy shall comply with the provisions of the motor vehicle 
financial responsibility law "of any state ... " wherein the 
liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of 
the automobile may occur. 
We conclude that the restrictive endorsement hereinbefore 
set forth and discussed is ambiguous; that the construction 
thereof urged by defendant insurance carrier would be viola-
tive of the sections of the Vehicle Code heretofore discussed; 
and that said sections were intended by the Legislature to be, 
and are, a part of every policy of motor vehicle liability in-
surance issued by an insurance carrier authorized to do busi-
ness in this state. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
Spence, .J., and McComb J., concurred in the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rrhearing was denied March 
20, 1957. Spence, .J., and McComb, ,J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
